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Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States from 
1913 "to 1921, became deeply involved in the Mexican Revolu­
tion from the day of his inauguration. His policies directly 
influenced the course of Mexico's history during that era and 
for a generation thereafter. Mexico, the preeminent inter­
national concern of the Wilson administration until June,
1915* provided the President with an opportunity to export 
his brand of Progressivism.^ Wilson's self-righteous
missionary zeal and his attempt to impose an ill-conceived
2policy collided with a fervent revolutionary nationalism.
The outcome was predictable.
Despite the advice of his closest advisor, Colonel 
Edward M. House, his old schoolmate "honest and honorable 
Cleveland Dodge," experts in international law in the 
Department of State, and American investors with Mexican 
interests, Woodrow Wilson refused to recognize the provi­
sional government of Victoriano Huerta. From the time of 
his inauguration in March of 1913 and throughout the remain­
ing spring, pressures for recognition steadily increased. 
Huerta's assassination of Madero and overthrow of Mexico's 
constitutional government deeply offended Wilson's moral 
sensibilities and according to the then Secretary of the 
Navy Josephus Daniels, the President clung tenaciously to 
the belief that "it would be wrong from every consideration 
to recognize the usurper."-^ This signified an important 
departure from the long-standing policy of the United States 
to matter-of-factly extend recognition to whomever exercised 
power in Mexico City.
In the Cabinet meeting of May 23, 1913, the Presi­
dent and his aides made the final decision not to recognize 
AHuerta. Wilson subsequently sent former governor of 
Minnesota, John Lind, to Mexico City with instructions to 
inform Huerta that recognition of any future government
2
True, the Revolutionists declare that they will take 
part in no election so long as Huerta remains . • • hut 
. . . even that may he arranged. We could set negotia­
tions going and prohahly hring ahout an armistice and a 
real election.7
Unfortunately, Wilson seriously overestimated the mallea­
bility of the Constitutionalists and underestimated Huerta's 
intransigence.
Wilson, through his agent John Lind threatened, 
consoled, and even tried "harefaced bribery" in an attempt 
to persuade Huerta to step down and agree not to stand for
Qreelection. Huerta proved to he a tough and able adversary.
For a time it seemed that Wilson’s hopes for a peaceful
resolution to the stalemate might he realized. Huerta's
Secretary of Foreign Affairs notified Wilson through Lind
that the Mexican Constitution prevented Huerta from
succeeding himself and Huerta announced in September "his
ardent desire to turn the government over to a constitutional 
„9successor.
In October 1913» however, Huerta dashed all hopes for 
a peaceful settlement when he arrested and imprisoned his 
political opponents in the Mexican Congress. Wilson now 
found himself in accord with the militant Constitutional 
position. He had tried in every way possible to remove 
Huerta from power. As the diplomatist Howard F. Cline noted, 
"Wilson's difficulties are an eloquent rebuttal to those who 
think it is a simple matter to dislodge even a small-time 
Strong Man under optimum circumstances. Short of armed
5
1 0invasion, a last resort, nothing worked.” But Wilson 
learned that there were definite limits to moral suasion. 
Convinced that nothing could "be accomplished by dealing with 
"a desperate brute like that traitor H u e r t a , W i l s o n  
decided to assist the rebel movement in forcefully ousting 
Huerta.
On November 1, Wilson dispatched an ultimatum 
threatening direct military intervention if Huerta failed to
*1 presign immediately. Huerta brazenly refused. Wilson's 
imprudent bluff proved counterproductive, lessening American 
credibility and temporarily rallying Mexican support for 
Huerta, "who now became (to his own surprise) a symbol of 
political independence in the face of Wilsonian pressures.”1  ̂
Wilson's ominous threats— then vacillation— almost aborted 
the rebellion. By December of 1913> Huerta's position 
seemed impregnable.
Wilson must have pondered this curious turn of 
events. Huerta, who a few months before had been despised 
almost everywhere outside Mexico City, was now a hero.
Wilson once again failed to grasp the nationalistic impulses 
that accompanied revolution. Anti-foreignism was perhaps 
the dominant theme of the revolution shared almost without 
exception by radicals, moderates and reactionaries, only 
Pancho Villa stands as a prominent exception.
Wilson moved on several fronts in the fall of 1913 
and early winter of 191^. There is substantial evidence to
suggest that he seriously considered forming a military 
alliance with Carranza. Colonel House noted in his diary of 
October 3°*
The President has in mind to declare war against 
Mexico. . . .  He will first blockade the ports, thereby 
cutting off all revenue from the Mexican Government 
Which will have a tendency to break down Huerta's 
resistance.
He has in mind also throwing a line across the 
southern part of Mexico, and perhaps another line just 
south of the Northern States. He plans to send troops 
to the Northern States, if they, the Constitutionalists 
consent, in order to protect the lives and property of 
foreign citizens* ■ • •
It is his purpose to send six battleships at 
once. . . . The President seems albert and unafraid. 15
These plans were never revealed to Carranza, the "First 
Chief." Perhaps Wilson never seriously considered imple­
menting them; but they do indicate the changing attitude of 
a frustrated President. Late in October, William Bayard 
Hale was sent to Arizona to confer with Carranza, who was at 
that time in Hermosillo forming a provisional Mexican govern­
ment. He met with Carranza and his subordinates during the 
second week in November. Hale conveyed Wilson's plan to 
mold an interim government once Huerta was deposed. In 
addition, Hale tried to impress upon Carranza the necessity 
for safeguarding the lives and property of foreign nationals 
in Mexico in order to stifle the growing interventionist 
sentiment in the United States. In return, the United States 
would lift the arms embargo, thus allowing the revolution-
-I £aries to acquire badly needed arms.
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Carranza denounced such putative interference in 
Mexico's internal affairs; the First Chief correctly 
perceived that if Wilson's conditions were met, it would he 
the President of the United States who would determine the 
course of the revolutionary movement in Mexico. The central 
point of contention between Wilson and Carranza was the 
insistence by the latter that the United States government 
not interfere. In most other matters of substance, they 
concurred. For example, the Constitutionalists, through 
Hale, assured the President of early elections. Hale 
reported s
Their answer to your question as to their intention 
to give the people an early opportunity to elect 
President and Congress at free and fair elections is an 
earnest affirmative and they further affirm that they 
will surrender the Government into the hands of those 
selected . . . even though persons selected were not preferred by them.17
Despite these assurances, Wilson ordered Hale home. He 
could not frighten Huerta out of office and the Constitution­
alists would not defer to his judgment; so Woodrow Wilson 
adopted a policy of "watchful waiting."
By January of 191^1 Wilson had gained a much clearer 
picture of the Constitutionalists and their cause. Luis 
Cabrera, Carranza's special agent in Washington, had opened 
an enlightening dialogue with the State Department. His 
objective, of course, was to persuade Washington to lift the
arms embargo; simultaneously, he reassured Wilson via the
1 ftState Department of Carranza's aims. Cabrera's dialogue
included extensive discussions into the nature of the reforms
19proposed hy Carranza and the Constitutionalists. 7 Probably 
for the first time, Wilson grasped some of the social and 
economic ramifications of the revolution. Within a few 
months, Wilson would publicly endorse what would have seemed 
unthinkable six months before— nothing less than social and 
economic revolution.
Wilson's heightened sensitivity toward the revolu­
tion and the virtual military stalemate that had developed 
in Mexico influenced his decision to lift the arms embargo 
on, February 3, 191^. John Lind and other American agents
advised Wilson that to gain the offensive, the Conbtitution-
20alists badly needed arms. Yet, the lifting of the arms
embargo had little immediate effect on the military fortunes
of the Constitutionalists. In late March, Lind advised that
21the United States directly intervene. Fortunately, Wilson 
realized that Lind's proposal to send the Marines into 
Mexico City might once again rekindle support for Huerta and 
certainly alienate the Constitutionalists over whom thb 
President hoped to exert some influence.
On April 9> Huertista soldiers mistakenly arrested 
and detained some U.S. Naval personnel in Tampico. Although 
the sailors were quickly released with an apology by the 
Mexican commander, the incident provided a pretext for 
Wilson to order the occupation of the strategic port of 
Veracruz. Wilson, at first reluctant to take such an
adventurous step, probably was influenced by John Lind,
recently returned from Mexico. Lind assured the President
that the citizens of Veracruz would welcome liberation from
the oppressive Huerta and no resistance to the occupation
22should be anticipated. The President apparently concluded 
that such limited intervention would not seriously antagp.® 
nize Carranza since the major source of Huerta's revenues 
would be denied the First Chief. Too, Wilson probably anti­
cipated (and in the future took advantage of) the political 
leverage afforded by the occupation.
The taking of Veracruz did not go as smoothly as 
anticipated and when the smoke cleared, there were nineteen 
Americans dead; the Mexican casualties exceeded three hun­
dred. When the news reached Wilson, he was "appallbd and 
unnerved. Huerta and Carranza in bellicose indignation 
demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Americans. A 
perplexed and downhearted President attempted to reassure 
the Constitutionalists that the United States had no inten­
tion of conducting a war against the Mexican people, but was
2 hmerely seeking reparations from Huerta. The full impact 
of a failed policy now demanded reassessment.
The first indications that Veracruz had a telling 
effect on Wilson and his Mexican policy surfaced almost 
immediately when he accepted an offer of multilateral 
arbitration. The occupation of Veracruz caused considerable 
concern in Latin America. It appeared as if the United
10
States was once again engaging in "gunboat diplomacy." 
Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (the A. B. C. powers) offered 
to mediate the dispute. Wilson had no desire to resolve any­
thing with the Huerta regime, but accepted mediation in hopes 
of eliminating Huerta and avoiding further bloodshed. He 
so informed the mediators and added that the government 
displacing Huerta must prosecute "such reforms as will 
reasonably assure the ultimate removal of the present causes 
of discontent. J Later m  the negotiations, Secretary of 
State Bryan forcefully reiterated Wilson's positions
It would in our judgment be futile to set up a 
provisional authority which would be neutral. It must, 
to be successful, be actually, avowedly, and sincerely 
in favor of the necessary agrarian and political 
reforms, and it must be pledged to their immediate 
formulation, not merely requested to devote special 
attention" to them.26
Predictably, Carranza refused to be bound by the 
negotiations. He could not tolerate outside intervention—  
even if it worked in his favor. Meanwhile, Wilson did 
everything in his power to see that the Latin American 
mediation effort concluded with Carranza and the Constitu­
tionalists in power, Wilson refused to accept any other 
solution.2'7 Despite the fact that the mediators demanded 
and received acceptance of a strict arms embargo to all 
combatants in Mexico, Wilson, the great moralist, made sure
that ammunition reached the rebels when they desperately 
28needed it. While the mediators debated, the Constitution­
alist armies pressed forward.
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Although the essence of revolutionary nationalism 
eluded Wilson, by April he demonstrated an awareness of the 
underlying causes of the revolution. According to Wilsons
It is a curious thing that every demand for the 
establishment of order in Mexico takes into consider­
ation, not order for the benefit of the people of 
Mexico, the great mass of the population, but order for 
the benefit of the old-time regime, for the aristocrats, 
for the vested interests, for the men who are respon­
sible for this very condition of disorder. No one asks 
for the order because order will help the masses of the 
people to get a portion of their rights and their land; 
but all demand it so that the great owners of property, 
the overlords, the hidalgos, the men who have exploited 
that rich country for their own selfish purposes, shall 
be able to continue their process undisturbed by the 
protests of the people from whom their wealth and power 
have been obtained.29
The President went on to say, "My passion is for the 
submerged 85 percent of the people. . . . "  He attributed 
much of Mexico's problem to "the virtual enslavement of 
Mexico's peasantry." Although he did not say so, he was in 
effect embracing the concept of class war. There was no 
turning back the clock. As he put it, "I say to you that 
the old order is dead."-^
Yet he persisted in his view that only the United 
States could "properly direct" the Mexicans "so that the new 
order which will have its foundation on human liberty and 
human rights, shall prevail."-^1 In the spring of 191^, 
Wilson was at least abreast of Carranza in the revolutionary 
scheme of things•
Prior to the Veracruz intervention, Wilson's Mexican 
policy had been based on the naive assumption that Mexico's
problems could be solved by a new constitution and free 
elections. With a few "good men," Wilson felt that reform—  
New Freedom style— would, if implemented, redress the social 
and economic ills that plagued that nation. Fortunately, 
Wilson came to understand that the Mexican was not merely 
a Spanish speaking Anglo-Saxon and that fundamental differ­
ences did exist. Wilson's idealism resulted in an incoherent 
and unrealistic policy during his first year in office. Yet, 
with all its inconsistencies, this idealism allowed Wilson 
to ride the revolutionary tide and avoid the strong undertow 
of interventionist sentiment in the latter half of 1914 and 
1915- As the summer of 1914 approached, Wilson confronted a 
new and unsettling problem— the disintegration of the 
Constitutionalist coalition which he now so avidly supported.
There was never any real doubt in Wilson's mind 
about who should lead the new revolutionary government. Of 
the three major revolutionary leaders, Villa, Zapata, and 
Carranza, only the latter met Wilson's standards. Villa and 
Zapata were excellent leaders and had more loyal followers 
than Carranza. Yet, neither was well-educated or refined. 
Their provincialism and radicalism could lead to unpredict­
able results.
On the other hand, Venustiano Carranza and Wilson 
shared a certain political symmetry— essentially bourgeois- 
Each viewed change as desirable and proper when accomplished 
in an orderly (constitutional) and democratic way. Carranza
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lacked Wilson's intellectual depth. He was according to
one historian, "bourgeois mediocrity incarnate." The First
Chief was, however, a dedicated liberal in the vein of Gomez,
Farias, Juarez, Lerdo and Madero. His primary objective was
political reform; social and economic reform was necessary
he felt, but not along the radical lines proposed by Villa 
32and Zapata.
In recent years an apparent consensus has evolved
among historians which asserts that Wilson's Mexican policy
33drifted aimlessly through the revolution. This view, 
however, is applicable only to the first year and a half of 
his administration. By the summer of 1914, Wilson had 
embarked on a new and ambitious program to assure the 
ascension of Venustiano Carranza. Wilson's desire to 
"assist" Carranza directly conflicted with the nationalistic 
underpinnings of the revolutionary movement. While the 
resulting enmity between the two ebbed and flowed, Wilson 
continued to mold his policies to Carranza's advantage.
When Venustiano Carranza entered Mexico City on 
August 18, 1914, he faced the impossible task of maintaining 
the broad coalition that had swept Huerta from power.
Already a de facto split had occurred between the revolu­
tion’ s two most powerful leaders, Villa and Carranza/which 
had been temporarily repaired with American assistance. The 
State Department was busy throughout the summer trying to 
abort an open breach. Villa— who openly distrusted the First
14
Chief— and Emiliano Zapata threatened new violence unless
34an acceptable compromise could he found.
Unfortunately, divisions in the ranks of the revolu­
tionaries went far beyond personalities. Central to the 
problem was Carranza's Plan de Guadalupe. Its intent was 
political and basically consistent with the Constitution of 
1857* For some months, Carranza had promised to move beyond 
mere political issues, and embrace social and economic 
reform. Now the time had come to define the specific nature 
of that reform and delineate measures to accomplish it. 
Carranza, the former hacendado, clung to an essentially 
moderate approach. Zapata and Villa rejected Carranza's 
position and resented his imposition of a virtual military
dictatorship. By the early fall, it was evident that no
3 ̂compromise could avert renewed fighting. J
Wilson, closely following events in Mexico during 
the summer of 1914, hoped that with Huerta out of the way, 
the revolutionaries might somehow iron out their differences 
amicably. Carranza's announced intention to establish a 
"revolutionary military rule" disturbed Wilson because it 
controverted assurances made to him by Carranza's representa­
tives that his primary objective was to reestablish constitu­
tional rule. Nevertheless, Wilson intimated that this did 
not necessarily preclude the possibility of recognition if 
Carranza acted moderately.36 The United States supported the 
Convention of Aguascalientes in which the followers of
15
Zapata, Villa and Carranza attempted to reach some form of
agreement. The attempt failed and threw the forces of the
Constitutionalists (Carrancistas) and the Conventionists
(Villistas and Zapatistas) once again into the field— this
time on opposite sides. Officially, the United States
37adopted a position of neutrality.
Legitimate grounds existed for the United States 
to extend de facto recognition to the Conventionist govern-
opment in Mexico City. In addition to occupying the 
capital, they controlled most of the countryside. Ostensi­
bly, they were more representative of the revolution, having 
been elected by a majority of delegates assembled at Aguas- 
calientes; the Conventionist President, Eulalio Gutierrez, 
was a former Carrancista.
Then too, there were more pragmatic advantages for 
the Wilson Administration to assist the Conventionist 
government. In the United States, Villa, the most powerful 
Conventionist leader, engendered a great deal of popular 
suppprt. Portrayed in the press as a kind of latter-day 
Robin Hood, his romantic image combined with his amiable 
attitude toward America and Americans making him a popular 
if not heroic figure. Carranza, on the other hand, had not 
been well-received. The American Catholic Church vehemently 
despised him because of his anti-clerical stand. More 
importantly, Villa had shown himself much more receptive-to 
suggestions from the White House than the obstinate
16
Carranza. ^  Wilson must have been tempted to support some­
one over whom he could exert substantial influence.
Yet Wilson insisted on an official neutrality, a 
posture which could benefit only Carranza. While the major 
source of Villa's income (Chihuahua's beef) was forbidden
entry into the United States for "sanitary reasons," Wilson
cturned over the revenue generating port of Veracruz to 
knCarranza. At the same time, the United States government 
made no attempt to cut off the shipment of arms to the 
Constitutionalists albeit publicly urging compromise and 
decrying the destruction of life and property. Whether or 
not the United States intentionally bent its neutrality, its 
position decisively enhanced Carranza's ability to wage war 
while simultaneously diminishing that of his enemies.
For over six months, Mexico convulsed in unrelenting 
warfare. Wilson devoted his major efforts toward safe­
guarding the lives and property of Americans and other 
nationals caught in the midst of the fighting (he feared 
inflammatory acts might ignite public opinion in the United 
States to a degree he could not control). Thus, he expended 
enormous diplomatic energy securing assurances from both 
sides that they would respect foreign lives and property. 
Considering the extent of carnage and lack of central 
authority, Wilson's endeavors in this regard were remarkably 
successful. Until the chaos subsided somewhat, the United 
States could do little else.
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Throughout the winter and early spring of 1915. 
the Constitutionalist armies slowly advanced northward, hut 
neither Villa nor Carranza's key general, Obregon, could 
sustain a concerted military effort. Reports of anarchy 
and chaos continued to inundate the State Department.
In an obvious bid for recognition, Carranza issued 
a proclamation designed, in part, to reassure the President 
of his commitment to constitutional government. Once law 
and order were reestablished, the First Chief promised he 
would establish a democratic government, protect religious 
freedom and institute agrarian reform. In addition, he 
agreed to settle the question of foreign debt and scrupu­
lously observe the property rights of foreign nationals.^
Carranza's proclamation pleased Wilson. "This is 
a very sensible document," he wrote Bryan, "though West's 
report . . . does not seem to afford much prospect of real 
control by Carranza." Duval West had been sent to Mexico 
by Wilson to assess the military and political situation 
there. From Wilson's point of view, the news was not good. 
West seriously misjudged the military posture of the Consti­
tutionalist armies and reported that the possibility of 
decisive victory by either side was remote. J The President 
obviously had hoped that Carranza's prospects would be 
brighter. "It is disappointing of course," he remarked,
"but what we wanted was the truth. Wilson, deluded by 
West's report and believing Carranza's movement on the verge
18
of collapse, still refrained from seriously negotiating 
with the apparent victors• On April 19 > through his 
Secretary of State, the President refused to receive a 
formal Conventionist delegation.
In addition to assuaging the American President, 
Carranza attempted to prod Wilson into recognition hy 
exploiting racial tensions along the border. The full extent 
of the First Chief's involvement with the Plan of San Diego 
is still not entirely clear; undoubtedly, however, it was 
substantial. While his representatives disavowed any 
association with the escalation of border raids- Carranza 
secretly encouraged them. This chimerical endeavor to 
pressure Washington ultimately failed, but in the early 
summer of 1915i border strife reinforced the administra­
tion's perception that instability in Mexico continued 
unabated. ^
The Constitutionalist forces failed to achieve any 
major victories between the time West filed his report and
h 6the President decided that some new initiative was needed.
On June 2, Wilson issued a stern statement to the press in 
which he warned the factional leaders that they must somehow 
'’accommodate their differences and unite" or the United 
States would be compelled to take some decisive action. 
Furthermore, Wilson threatened to end official neutrality 
and "support some man or group of men" if the revolutionaries 
could not solve their problems-^ Wilson must have realized
by now that the obstinate First Chief was unlikely to 
respond positively to this form of intimidation. Perhaps 
the President hoped to pressure Carranza's adversaries into 
a negotiated submission. This view seems tenable in light 
of Wilson's instructions to his Secretary of State on the 
same day. Wilson advised Bryan not to rule out the possi­
bility of recognizing Carranza "if he should develop the
l̂Q
necessary influence to bring order out of chaos."
The first week of June yielded indications of the 
emerging military ascendancy of the Constitutionalists.^ 
Following his defeat at Leon de las Aldemas, Villa accepted 
Wilson's call for a negotiated settlement. The Convention­
ist leader, claiming he controlled the largest share of 
Mexico agreed to meet with Carranza and the other chiefs in 
order to avoid American intervention. Carranza, tasting 
victory, refused to reply (directly) to the Wilson initia­
tive. Instead, he issued a manifesto calling on foreign 
powers to recognize his regime. The First Chief once 
again was rejecting Wilson's assistance, or as Carranza 
perceived it— interference.
Partly because of West's report, and partly because 
of his experience with the ever changing situation in Mexico, 
the President continued to be cautious. While Villa 
exaggerated the extent of Conventionist control, vast areas 
of Mexico remained outside the hegemony of the Constitution­
alists. Nonetheless, The New York Times correctly reported
20
the administration1s apparent willingness to recognize
Carranza if the Constitutionalists occupied the capital and
<1demonstrated some ability to contain Villa.
On June 17, the President ashed his new Secretary of
State, Robert Lansing to convey to Carranza the possibility
"that we might recognize him" if the First Chief would make
52some gesture of conciliation toward the other factions.
Carranza refused the President's offer. Wilson, extremely
disappointed at Carranza's continued intransigence, worried
that there was little prospect of anything but continued 
53fighting. ^
With this thought in mind, Wilson approved a
proposal by the Secretary of State to join with the A. B. C.
i it 54-powers and attempted to bring order out of chaos.
Lansing suggested the United States present a plan to invite
representatives of the various factions in Mexico to the
conference table for the purpose of establishing a coalition
government. Lansing maintained that the retirement of
Carranza, Villa and Zapata was necessary if peace was to be 
55achieved. Wilson approved the general thrust of the plan,
but rejected as unrealistic the idea that each of the major
leaders retire.^ The President intended to keep the door
open for Carranza.
When the conference began, Lansing evidently failed
to understand the President's predisposition toward 
57C a r r a n z a . I n  the first meeting, Lansing argued the
21
senselessness of attempting to deal with Carranza as "he had
no intention of surrendering his will to constitutional
government."'^ When he learned of Lansing's statement, the
President admonished Lansing stating "Carranza will somehow
have to he digested into the scheme and ahove all the object
■I 59of the revolution will have to be in any event conserved.
In another note, the President endorsed Carranza's 
decision to establish a temporary dictatorship. He wrote 
Lansing:
It seems to me necessary that a provisional 
government essentially revolutionary in character 
should take action to institute reforms by decree 
before the full forms of the constitution are 
resumed. This was the original program of the 
revolution and seems to me probably an essential 
part of it.60
The United States extended de facto recognition to 
the Constitutionalists in October. Thereafter, Wilson 
confronted a Mexican Chief of State unwilling to be directed 
by Washington. "It's a great pity," the President observed 
about Carranza, "that nothing can be done either with him or 
through him." Nonetheless, the President must have taken 
some comfort in the fact that the leader of the revolution 
adhered to a liberal, bourgeois social and political philos­
ophy.
By his own standards, Wilson's policy was a success. 
He achieved his immediate goals. Huerta was gone and 
Carranza in power. Villa and Zapata now posed no real 
threat and a new constitution was being drafted.
22
Yet the legacy of Wilson's handling of the Mexican 
situation is not positive. It reinforced in Mexico and 
throughout Latin Americai’the image of American imperialism 
and interference. Wilson's vacillation, confusion and 
ignorance prolonged Huerta's regime and led to increased 
losses of life and property. Finally, Wilson's singleminded 
support of Carranza and his brand of Constitutionalism may 
well have thwarted the revolution's true destiny and 
potential.
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